exculpatory evidence; the subject was not nearly as complex and controversial as it is today. 10 Thus, as the edifice for the doctrine that has spawned hundreds of decisions immunizing prosecutors from civil liability for acts of willful misconduct -misconduct that occasionally resulted in innocent defendants being convicted and punished 11 -
Imbler appears in retrospect to have been a gratuitous experiment in judicial administration that not only failed to protect the judicial process but in fact skewed the balance of power in the criminal justice system more heavily toward prosecutors.
12
Moreover, by removing a deterrent to abuse of power by prosecutors, Imbler encouraged dishonest prosecutors to hit below the belt, and discouraged honest prosecutors fro doing the right thing. Although Imbler's perverse analysis of incentives and disince applies to the conduct of prosecutors across the board, there is one area of prosecutorial misconduct in which Imbler's adoption of absolute immunity for prosecutors applies with special force --the prosecutor's decision to conceal from a defendant exculpatory evidence that in some cases could be used to prove the defendant's innocence. Tha the subject of this Article: whether prosecutors should enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for deliberately suppressing exculpatory evidence, or whether the Su Imbler thereafter filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Pachtman and various officers of the Los Angeles police department alleging a conspiracy to deprive him of his liberty in violation of due process. 28 Imbler's complaint essentially tracked the district court's opinion in alleging that Pachtman, intentionally and negligently, allowed Costello to give false testimony; that Pachtman was chargeable with the fingerprint expert's suppression; that Pachtman knew that a lie detector test had cleared Imbler; and that Pachtman had used at trial the altered artist's sketch. 29 The district court granted Pachtman's motion to dismiss the complaint, 30 holding that public prosecutors repeatedly had been afforded immunity from civil liability for "acts done as part of their traditional official functions." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Pachtman's acts were committed during prosecutorial activities that
were "an integral part of the judicial process."
31
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the "important and recurring issue" of prosecutorial liability under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 32 The Court acknowledged at the outset that Section 1983, the statutory remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights caused by an official's abuse of power, 33 contains no immunities for 27 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415. 28 Id. at 415-416. 29 Id. at 416. 30 prosecutors. 34 However, the Supreme Court assumed that Congress did not intend to abrogate all of the immunities that existed at common law, and the Court identified those immunities that were available for certain parties at common law. 35 Thus, according to the Court, absolute immunity was available at common law for judges, 36 legislators, 37 grand jurors, 38 and other government officials such as assessors, highway officers, and members of township boards. 39 In addition, absolute immunity, referred to as "defamation immunity," also was available to any person for statements that were made in the course of judicial proceedings. 40 However, absolute immunity was not afforded to other government officials, only a qualified immunity, referred to at common law as person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 34 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417. Indeed, in 1871, when Section 1983 was enacted, public prosecutors did not exist in their modern form and criminal prosecutions ordinarily were instituted by private citizens.
. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring)(noting that at common law private citizens typically performed the functions currently delegated to public prosecutors); Burns v. Reed 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting)(noting that "prosecutorial functions, had they existed in their modern form in 1871, would have been considered quasi-judicial"). It was 25 years later that a state court would address for the first time a prosecutor's immunity from civil liability. See Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896)(holding prosecutor absolutely immune in civil action alleging that prosecutor maliciously and without probable cause added plaintiff's name to grand jury true bill after grand jury refused to indict plaintiff and which resulted in plaintiff's arrest and incarceration). 35 Imbler , 424 U.S. at 417-419. The Court cited Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) , for the conclusion that immunities "well grounded in history and reason" had not been abrogated "by covert inclusion in the general language" of section 1983. 36 Id. at 418, 423 n. 20 ("The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law."). 37 Id. at 418, noting that "regardless of any unworthy purpose animating their actions, legislators were held to enjoy under this statute their usual immunity when acting 'in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act,'" quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 379. 38 Id. at 423 n. 20 (noting that the immunity of grand jurors enjoys "an almost equally venerable common law tenet" as judges). 39 For discussion of these immunities, see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, "prosecutorial functions, had they existed in their modern form in 1871, would have been considered quasi-judicial (wherefore they are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983)." Id. (emphasis in original). 40 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426 n. 23 ("In the law of defamation, a concern for the airing of all evidence has resulted in an absolute privilege for any courtroom statement relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding. In the case of lawyers the privilege extends to their briefs and pleadings as well.").
"quasi-judicial immunity." 41 Qualified immunity was available to government officials such as governors, 42 other executive branch officials, 43 and police officers. 44 With respect to a prosecutor's immunity at common law, Imbler concluded, as had several lower courts, that it is "well settled" that a prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity when he acted within the scope of his prosecutorial duties. 45 To be sure, prosecutors are members of the executive branch, and as the Court noted, executive branch officials such as governors and police officers at common law received only qualified immunity. 46 Moreover, Imbler referred to a prosecutor as a "quasi-judicial"
official, and at common law, absolute immunity was not available to quasi-judicial officials. 47 Nonetheless, Imbler emphasized the prosecutor's "functional comparability"
to judges and grand jurors to the extent that all of these parties make discretionary decisions on the basis of evidence presented to them in court. 48 Thus, despite some analytical gaps and inconsistencies, Imbler was able to extrapolate from the common law two broad categories in which absolute immunity for prosecutors would be available; 41 Id. at 420, 423 n. 20 (referring to grand jurors and prosecutors as "quasi-judicial" officers); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 500 (noting that quasi-judicial immunity afforded an official only qualified immunity)(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. at 132 (noting that at common law, the discretionary decisions of public officials that did not involve actual adjudication were protected by "quasi-judicial" immunity, and is "more akin to what we now call 'qualified,' rather than absolute immunity")(Scalia, J., concurring 47 See supra note 41, and accompanying text. 48 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20. ("Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials judge, grand juror, and prosecutor exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of the evidence presented to them…It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as 'quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities being termed 'quasi-judicial' as well.")."
first, suits for malicious prosecution, 49 and second, suits alleging courtroom misconduct that involves the examination of witnesses and arguments to the jury.
50
Imbler, however, extended a prosecutor's absolute immunity beyond these two categories. Relying on public policy, Imbler reasoned that if a prosecutor was constrained in making "every decision" by the threat of a civil lawsuit, the public trust in the prosecutor's office might be compromised. 51 Imbler speculated that lawsuits against prosecutors could be expected "with some frequency," 52 and that the prosecutor's energy and attention to his work as a consequence would be diverted. 53 Imbler further argued, but did not elaborate, that affording prosecutors only qualified immunity would have an adverse effect on the criminal justice system because a prosecutor would face "greater difficulty" in meeting the standard of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials. 54 Moreover, according to Imbler, a prosecutor might be discouraged from presenting evidence whose accuracy might be questionable, or making arguments about that evidence, if the use of and arguments about that evidence exposed him to personal liability. 55 In sum, according to Imbler, "the ultimate fairness of the 49 Id. at 422-424. 50 Id. at 426 n. 23. 51 Id. at 424-425 ("A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages."). 52 Id. at 425. 53 Id. ("if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law"). 54 Id. ("It is fair to say, we think, that the honest prosecutor would face greater difficulty in meeting the standards of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials."). The Court noted that prosecutors operate under "serious constraints of time and even information," but did not explain why other executive and administrative officials who receive qualified immunity but who operate under similar constraints would not face the same burdens as prosecutors). 55 Id. at 426 (noting that veracity of witnesses in criminal cases "frequently is subject to doubt," and "[i]f prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence").
operation of the system itself would be weakened by subjecting prosecutors to §1983
liability."
56
Although Imbler recognized that a genuinely wronged defendant would be without a civil remedy against a malicious and dishonest prosecutor, Imbler believed that the alternative would disserve the broader public interest. 57 In fact, Imbler surmised that a defendant might actually be prejudiced if he was able to pursue a § 1983 lawsuit against a prosecutor because a court that reviewed the prosecutor's conduct might skew its decision to protect the prosecutor from potential civil liability. 58 Moreover, Imbler asserted, alternative sanctions to civil lawsuits against prosecutors were available to deter a prosecutor's malicious and dishonest behavior. Indeed, the availability of bringing criminal charges against a prosecutor, 59 as well as the availability of professional discipline by bar associations, 60 would "not leave the public powerless." 61 "These checks," said the Court, "undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime."
62
The scope of the absolute immunity that Imbler afforded prosecutors was not demarcated precisely. Imbler used various formulations to describe the extent of a prosecutor's immunity, stating that absolute immunity would be available for prosecutors 56 Id. at 427. 57 See supra note 6, and accompanying text. 58 Id. at 428 (qualifying a prosecutor's immunity "often would prejudice defendants in criminal cases by skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice"); and 428 n. 27 ("consideration of the habeas petition could well be colored by an awareness of potential prosecutorial liability"). 59 Id. at 429. 60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Id. in "initiating a prosecution In his concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, did not disagree that absolute immunity would be appropriate when a prosecutor is sued civilly for knowingly eliciting and using false testimony to prove a defendant's guilt. Justice White drew this conclusion based on his understanding that a prosecutor's absolute immunity at common law extended to two kinds of lawsuits -suits for malicious prosecution, 74 and suits for defamatory remarks made during judicial proceedings. 75 As to the immunity for malicious prosecution, Justice White observed that this immunity was necessary to protect the judicial process because absent immunity, prosecutors might be afraid to bring proper charges against a defendant for fear of being sued if the defendant was acquitted. 76 As to the immunity for statements made in court, Justice White observed that this immunity was also necessary to protect the judicial process by encouraging those persons involved in judicial proceedings to make complete 71 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416. 72 Id. 73 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34. 74 Id. at 438 ("I agree with the majority that, with respect to suits based on claims that the prosecutor's decision was malicious, and without probable cause…the judicial process is better served by absolute immunity than by any other rule."). 75 Id. at 440 (noting that function of judicial proceeding is "to determine where the truth lies," and those parties involved in judicial proceedings should be encouraged to make full disclosure of all relevant information). 76 Id. at 438 ("If suits for malicious prosecution were permitted, the prosecutor's incentive would always be not to bring charges.").
and candid disclosures of all relevant information without fear of being sued for false and defamatory testimony and arguments. 77 Indeed, Justice White observed, it is precisely the function of a judicial proceeding to determine the truth, and since it is often impossible for attorneys to be absolutely certain of objective truth and falsity, a prosecutor should be given every incentive to submit the testimony of witnesses to the crucible of the judicial process without being subjected to liability based on the claim that he knew or should have known that the testimony of the witness was false.
78
However, according to Justice White, the majority extended to prosecutors an immunity that was not available at common law --immunity for the suppression of exculpatory evidence. 79 Rather than protecting the judicial process, according to Justice
White, affording a prosecutor absolute immunity for such conduct in fact undermines the judicial process by removing an incentive to prosecutors to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the defendant. 80 Accusing the majority of an illogical extension of immunity, Justice White explained that whereas it is sensible to afford defamation immunity to prosecutors to encourage prosecutors to elicit all relevant information to assist the fact-finder in arriving at the truth, "it would stand this immunity rule on its head" to apply it to a prosecutor who withholds relevant information from the fact-finder and thereby prevents the fact-finder from arriving at the truth. 81 Thus, according to 77 Id. at 439. 78 Id. at 440 ("I agree with the majority that history and policy support an absolute immunity for prosecutors from suits based solely on claims that they knew or should have known that the testimony of a witness called by the prosecution was false."). Justice White appended a clarifying footnote that absolute immunity should not apply to independent claims that the prosecutor withheld facts demonstrating the falsity of the witness's testimony in constitutionally material respects. Id. at 440 n. 5. 79 Id. at 441 ("I disagree with any implication that the absolute immunity extends to suits charging unconstitutional suppression of evidence."). 80 Id. at 442 ("one would expect that the judicial process would be protected and indeed its integrity enhanced by denial of immunity to prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct"). 81 is "virtually impossible" to identify any injury to the judicial process from permitting such suits.
93
In its Brady footnote, the majority saw no difference in principle between a prosecutor knowingly presenting false testimony and a prosecutor suppressing evidence that would demonstrate that falsity. "The distinction is not susceptible of practical application," the majority contended. 94 Moreover, the majority argued, to require a prosecutor to make a "full disclosure" of potentially exculpatory evidence to obtain absolute immunity would place upon the prosecutor a duty that might far exceed the disclosure requirements of Brady. 95 Moreover, according to the majority, denying immunity to the prosecutor would "weaken the adversary system" as well as "interfere with the legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion." 93 Id. at 444-445 ("Where the reason for the rule extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it would truly be 'monstrous to deny recovery'"), citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 94 Id. at 431 n. 34. ("A claim of using perjured testimony simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of suppression of the evidence upon which the knowledge of perjury rested."). 95 Id. 96 Id. The majority suggested that there was no principled distinction between a prosecutor knowingly using perjured testimony and knowingly suppressing information demonstrating the falsity. Id ("As a matter of principle, we perceive no less an infringement of a defendant's rights by the knowing use of perjured testimony than by the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information."). However, the majority likely was aware that the distinction was neither unprincipled and nor abstract. Indeed, the Court would hear oral arguments the following month, and decide later that Term in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) that the distinction between a prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony and a prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence were distinct violations. Moreover, in contrast to Imbler, the Court in Agurs
III. The Brady Rule -Easily Evaded and Virtually Unenforceable
Of all the constitutional rules in criminal procedure that impose limits on a prosecutor's conduct, the rule of Brady v. Maryland 97 is unique in many ways. In all other areas of criminal procedure a prosecutor is commanded by the constitution, statutes, and ethics rules to refrain from striking foul blows. 98 Brady alone imposes on the prosecutor a positive duty of fairness. By tempering the prosecutor's traditional role of a zealous advocate with that of a neutral minister of justice, Brady promised to transform the U.S. criminal adversary system from a competitive sporting event into a more balanced and objective search for the truth. 99 As the Court in Brady observed:
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system described the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence as grounded in elementary notions of fairness to serve the cause of justice rather than as a function of a prosecutor's role as an advocate seeking to win a conviction. Id. at 111 (noting "prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice").. 97 373 U.S. 83 (1963) . 98 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)(although prosecutor "may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones"); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1994)(prosecutor has "special duty not to mislead"). 99 The prosecutor's Brady duty is contained in FED.R.CRIM. P. R. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)(upon a defendant's request, prosecutor must disclose evidence if "the item is material to preparing the defense"). There are widely inconsistent approaches in the U.S. courts at to what constitutes Brady evidence, the specific types of information required to be disclosed, when it must be disclosed, and the sanctions for noncompliance. . of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." 100 Further, in all other areas of constitutional criminal procedure in which an error has prejudiced a defendant, it is typically the prosecution that bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless. 101 Under Brady, however, it is the defendant who bears the burden to establish that the prosecution's suppression of favorable evidence was harmful. 102 Also, in all other areas of constitutional criminal procedure, the commission of a constitutional error -and a prosecutor's suppression of evidence under Brady violates due processrequires the prosecution to meet a much more stringent burden by proving that there is no reasonable possibility that the violation would have altered the verdict. 103 Under Brady, however, the defendant must prove that had it not been for the prosecutor's suppression, there is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict would have been different. 104 A reasonable probability, according to the Court, is a probability "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
105
However, rather than producing a fundamental change in the criminal justice system, Brady has become an illusory protection that is easily evaded and virtually 100 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Brady elaborated on this theme, alluding to the inscription on the walls of the Justice Department: "The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts." Id. 101 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)(harmless error rule "put[s] the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment"). 102 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985)(White, J., concurring)("I agree with the Court that respondent is not entitled to have his conviction overturned unless he can show that the evidence withheld by the Government was 'material'"); id. at 701 (Marshall, J,, dissenting)(criticizing standard that requires defendant to "shoulder the heavy burden of proving how [the undisclosed evidence] would have affected the outcome"). 103 See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)("The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24 ("There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. State of Connecticut about 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction' and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."). 104 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ("The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."). 105 Id.
unenforceable. 106 Brady represents a contradiction to the operation of the U.S. criminal adversary system. The prosecutor, on the one hand, is encouraged to be a zealous advocate charged with the responsibility of winning convictions against people who break the law, but at the same time is encouraged to be a neutral minister of justice with the duty to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence that might assist the defendant in obtaining an acquittal. ("Ultimately, though, our proceduralized adversarial model has rendered Brady, if not a dead letter, not a very vigorous one either. Judges are too weak, prosecutors are too partisan, enforcement is too difficult, discovery is too limited, and plea bargains are too widespread for Brady to influence many cases. Brady remains an important symbol but is some ways a hollow one."). 107 Id. at 696-697 (Marshall, J., dissenting)("for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to identify the material that could undermine his case"). 108 defects and inconsistencies are undertaken not as a "minister of justice,"
zealous partisan who keeps score of his convictions, is motivated by the rewards of winning, and is unlikely to sacrifice the conviction of a guilty defendant to an abstract principle of justice. The Brady rule runs counter to these considerations.
Moreover, Brady's counter-intuitiveness is based not only on general observations of the interests and incentives of a prosecutor within the criminal adversary system; Brady-compliance also runs counter to more nuanced considerations of the psychology of a prosecutor as she prepares for adversarial combat. Any prosecutor preparing for trial undoubtedly believes the defendant to be guilty and has assembled a cache of evidence to prove the defendant's guilt. Given the fact that that the prosecutor and the police have virtually total control of the evidence from the start of the investigation, 112 there inevitably may be evidence in the government's files that contradicts guilt and which might be viewed by a rational prosecutor as favorable to the defendant and subject to Brady disclosure. By the same token, however, a rational prosecutor who has carefully analyzed her proof in preparation for trial reasonably might view this contradictory evidence as irrelevant, unpersuasive, or unreliable and certainly not of such probative value to reach the high threshold of materiality that is required for disclosure under
Brady. 113 To be sure, a prosecutor has no discretion under Brady to refuse to search for 111 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.8 comment 1 (1983) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981)("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMNINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.2(c)(3d ed. 1993)("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1.1 (2d ed. 1991)("The primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that justice is accomplished." (district judge identifies at least 12 instances where the prosecution team "was caught making false representations and not meeting its discovery obligations," and as the court listed the violations, the court noted the government's responses -"testimony was immaterial;" government acted in "good faith;" "just a mistake;" "mistaken understanding;" evidence was "immaterial;" nondisclosure was :"inadvertent;" nondisclosure was "unintentional;" documents were "immaterial;" complaint by FBI agent against prosecutors for their misconduct had "no relevancy" and could be adequately addressed by the Office of Professional Responsibility. in Brady "appears to be using the word 'material' in its evidentiary sense, i.e., evidence that has some probative tendency to preclude a finding of guilt or lessen punishment"). 123 Bagley, 473 U.S. 699-700 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(Brady duty defined "not by reference to the possible usefulness of the particular evidence in preparing and presenting the case, but retrospectively by reference to likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial"). See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d at142:
The result of the progression from Brady to Agurs and Bagley is that the nature of the prosecutor's constitutional duty has shifted from (a) an evidentiary test of materiality that can be applied rather easily to any item of evidence (would this evidence have some tendency to undermine proof of guilt?) to (b) a result-affecting test that obliges a prosecutor to make a prediction as to whether a reasonable probability will exist that the outcome would have been different if disclosure had been made. To put it another way, Bagley makes the extent of the disclosure required by Brady dependent on the anticipated remedy for violation of the obligation to disclose: the prosecutor must disclose evidence if, without such disclosure, a reasonable probability will exist that the outcome of a trial in which the evidence had been disclosed would have been different (emphasis in original).. 126 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(Brady standard of materiality "invites a prosecutor, whose interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a chance that evidence will later turn out not to have been potentially dispositive"). 127 United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7 th Cir. 1990 ). See Gershman, supra note 125, at 551 ("The prosecutor's claim of ignorance as an excuse for compliance with Brady resembles a defendant's claim of ignorance as an excuse to avoid criminal liability."). But see David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L. J. 957, 976 (1999)("in legal ethics, unlike criminal law, there is no willful blindness doctrine"). 128 Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004)("A rule thus declaring 'prosecution may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendant due process."). 129 Id. at 695 ("Our decisions lend no support to the notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been disclosed.").
probably will remain hidden forever, 130 and that even if the evidence ever does surface, the obstacles to a defendant successfully using it are daunting. Office between 1975-1996, eighteen of which involved reversals of convictions based on prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence). 135 See Weinberg, supra note , at 3 (study finds many "recidivist prosecutors" around the country had "bent or broken the rules multiple times"). 136 and that an "honest" prosecutor would have greater difficulty in defending himself from "error" and "mistaken judgment" than other officials cloaked with qualified immunity. view his conduct at most as an error, a mistake of judgment, or negligent rather than as willful misconduct. And given the record in that case, it is neither surprising nor counterintuitive that Imbler chose to minimize the need for a civil remedy with respect to a prosecutor's conduct generally, and with respect to a prosecutor's Brady violations in particular. It is also noteworthy that the Court focused on the prosecutor's conduct in open court, and the advocacy decisions that a prosecutor makes before and during a trial that are subject to judicial review. The Court lumped together all of the conduct of a prosecutor that is related to the trial, apparently including all actions undertaken before trial, in secret, shielded from public scrutiny, and not subject to judicial oversight, such as
Brady decisions. To the extent that the Court assumed that a prosecutor's duty under
Brady to disclose evidence is undertaken as an "advocate" rather than as a "minister of justice," the Court lost sight of the special responsibilities assigned to the prosecutor by 
IV. Lack of Accountability for Brady Violations
Imbler acknowledged that the immunity it created left a wronged defendant without a civil remedy. 153 However, the Court added, this absence "does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs." 154 According to
Imbler, the policy considerations that mandate civil immunity for prosecutors do not place prosecutors beyond the reach of the criminal law, suggesting that prosecutors 153 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 ("To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty."). 154 Id. at 429.
would be subject to criminal prosecution for willful acts that violate the criminal law.
155
Imbler also observed that a prosecutor who "stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights," would be subject to professional discipline by bar associations. 156 "These checks," Imbler asserted, "undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime."
157
Imbler's confidence that prosecutors would face both criminal and professional sanctions for their misconduct has proved to be dramatically mistaken. Indeed, one of the central themes in criminal procedure and professional ethics since Imbler has been the lack of accountability of prosecutors for their misconduct, and especially for their misconduct that involves the deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. 158 As noted 155 Id. ("This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights…The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful acts."). 156 Id. (suggesting that a prosecutor is "perhaps unique…in his amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers"). 157 Id. , at 45-46 (expressing obvious lack of confidence in OPR's claim, made six months earlier, to conduct an investigation, and that to date, "the silence is deafening;" court also expresses "shock but not surprise" at lack of response by then-U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey to numerous letters from defense counsel urging commencement of formal investigation of prosecutors). 159 See supra notes 133-150, and accompanying text. 160 449 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1969). 161 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429 n. 29. The Court's reference to Branch is perplexing, and somewhat disingenuous. Branch reviewed a habeas petition by a California inmate convicted of possessing deadly that does not even support that principle, 162 was illogical then, and is even more unsupportable today. In fact, criminal sanctions against a prosecutor have hardly ever been enforced, either in California, or anywhere else in the United States. 163 An extensive search through the internet has located not a single instance in California since Imbler in which a prosecutor has been criminally prosecuted for acts related to his prosecutorial duties. 164 A nationwide search for instances of criminal charges against prosecutors in the last twenty-five years has turned up two criminal prosecutions stemming from highlypublicized criminal cases in which prosecutors were charged with crimes related to their deliberate violations of Brady. In 1999 in Chicago, county prosecutor Thomas L. Knight was charged by a special prosecutor with obstruction of justice, perjury, and conspiracy for his suppression of "obviously exculpatory" evidence that put an innocent man on death row in the murder of a 10-year-old girl. 165 Knight was acquitted. In 2007 in Detroit, weapons in his cell, who claimed that his attorney failed to conduct an adequate investigation that other prisoners had committed the same offense. The attorney at a hearing stated that he refused to act upon the petitioner's request because he had good reason to believe that the proposed testimony would be perjured. The appellate court noted that "an attorney may not knowingly allow a witness to testify falsely," and that "an attorney who attempts to benefit his client through the use of perjured testimony may be subject to criminal prosecution." Id. at 210. Thus, Branch did not involve the prosecution of a prosecutor, as the Court's citation would lead one to believe, nor did Branch suggest that a prosecutor would be subject to criminal charges, or that any prosecutor had ever been prosecuted in California for suborning perjury. Indeed, of the many hundreds of reported cases in California and the U.S. in which prosecutors have been found to have knowingly elicited false testimony, not one of those prosecutors as far as I have been able to determine has ever been subjected to criminal prosecution for suborning perjury. 162 Id.. 163 See Brink, supra note 12 at 27 ("leveling of criminal charges against a prosecutor for conduct occurring in the course of a prosecution is all but unheard of"); Andrew Smith, Cir. 1999 )(finding that "vexatious" means without probable cause or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith; "frivolous" means groundless and with little prospect of success brought primarily to embarrass or annoy the defendant; and "bad faith" is the conscious doing of wrong because of a dishonest purpose, a furtive design, or ill will, requiring more than bad judgment or negligence). According to Judge Gold, "the position taken by [Assistant United States Attorney] Cronin the prosecution] in filing the superseding indictment, in initiating and pursuing the collateral investigation based on unfounded allegations; suppressing information about the roles of two key government witnesses as cooperating witnesses in the collateral investigation; and attempting to secure evidence from the collateral investigation that would have jeopardized the trial and severely prejudiced the defendant, constitute bad faith." Shaygan, slip. op. at 29.. 177 Shaygan, slip op. at 2. culture where a "'win-at-any-cost' prosecution is not permitted," and that courts must impose sanctions for substantial prosecutorial abuses in order to "make the risk of non- In sum, Imbler believed that protecting the honest prosecutor from civil liability was the "lesser evil" than affording a civil remedy to a defendant wronged by a dishonest prosecutor. 185 Nevertheless, the Court assured the public that it would not be unprotected because prosecutors who abused their power would be subject to criminal prosecution and professional discipline. Today, thirty-four years later, it is abundantly clear that
Imbler's assurance was misguided and mistaken. Indeed, the only effective sanctionenabling the injured party to sue the wrongdoer directly -was discarded.
V. Bad Faith Exception to Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations
The extension of Imbler to a prosecutor's willful violation of Brady was an unjustified extension of absolute immunity thirty-four years ago, and appears much more which considered a supervisory prosecutor's immunity for the supervision and training of trial prosecutors, the Court emphasized the "practical anomalies" of affording a trial prosecutor absolute immunity for his intentional misconduct, but affording supervisors only qualified immunity for their negligence in training and supervising that prosecutor. 198 The Court's concern with parity would appear to apply equally to Brady violations. Thus, it is well-established that a prosecutor's disclosure duty extends to evidence in the possession of the police, even if the prosecutor is unaware of that evidence because, according to Kyles v. Whitley, 199 a prosecutor has "a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." 200 To be sure, for Brady purposes the police are considered an "arm of the prosecutor," 201 and as virtually every circuit has concluded, have a derivative duty under Brady to turn over to the prosecutor potentially exculpatory evidence. 202 Thus, if the police hide exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor, they violate their Brady duty and are subject to civil liability under § 1983 for which violation they recei at most only qualified immunity.
ve olice e prosecutor. 203 Thus, just as it would be incongruous to afford prosecutors absolute immunity for engaging in investigative misconduct for which p enjoy qualified immunity, and for giving bad advice to the police for which the police would receive qualified immunity if they mistakenly relied on that advice, it would seem just as incongruous to afford prosecutors absolute immunity for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant but afford the police only qualified immunity for failing to turn that same evidence over to th prosecutor to commit a fraud on the judicial process -to defraud the defendant of his right to a fair trial, the court of the assurance that its discovery orders have been complied with, and the jury of learning all of the facts that would materially assist its mission to arrive at the truth. 205 Bad faith conduct embraces the quality of "moral turpitude" that subjects the conduct of all attorneys to professional discipline 206 Creating an exception for bad faith conduct of prosecutors that violates constitutional rules is hardly a novel proposal. Such an exception has been recognized by the Court in several areas involving the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. For example, with respect to a prosecutor's charging function, the Supreme Court has stated that so long as a prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused has committed a criminal offense, the decision whether or not to prosecute rests entirely in his discretion. 207 However, the Court has created several exceptions when a prosecutor institutes charges in bad faith, such as selectively charging persons based on unconstitutional standards relating to race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications, 208 bringing charges in order to harass a defendant. 210 Further, the Court has also recognized a bad faith exception to the rule that allows prosecutors virtually unfettered discretion in deciding when to bring charges. 211 Thus, when a prosecutor delays bringing charges against a defendant in order to gain a "tactical advantage" over the accused, 212 due process may be invoked to bar prosecution. 213 Moreover, although double jeopardy does not protect a defendant who seeks a mistrial from being retried, the Court has created an exception to this rule in order to prevent a prosecutor from subverting a defendant's double jeopardy rights. 214 Thus, when a prosecutor engages in bad faith conduct for the purpose of provoking a defendant into seeking a mistrial, the protection of double jeopardy may be invoked to prevent the prosecutor from retrying the defendant.
215
Finally, although the government's loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence does not by itself violate due process, the Court has created an exception for exculpatory evidence which was lost or destroyed by the prosecution in bad faith for the purpose of preventing its use by the defendant.
216
A bad faith exception to absolute immunity for a prosecutor's deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence is consistent with the Court's adoption of other exceptions for bad faith conduct by prosecutors. As noted above, the bad faith suppression of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors is a matter of increasing concern to courts and commentators, has contributed to the convictions of innocent persons, and is not subject to meaningful sanctions that might deter such misconduct. A bad faith exception would be limited to conduct by prosecutors that is deliberately undertaken to deprive a defendant of materially favorable evidence, thereby depriving a defendant of a fair trial. A "Brady exception" to absolute immunity would effect only a modest inroad into the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. But such an exception would make a significant contribution to the integrity of the judicial process, which was the rationale for the Imbler rule in the first place, and would make prosecutors accountable for their deliberate constitutional violations.
Conclusion
Despite being built on questionable history and speculative policy, Imbler v.
Pachtman has been the foundation for the well-established rule that affords prosecutors absolute immunity from civil liability for conduct that is integrally related to the judicial process. According to Imbler, and reaffirmed in subsequent decisions, the absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor's deliberate concealment from the defense of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. This is so even though Imbler's concern that absolute immunity is necessary to protect the integrity and fairness of the judicial process is inconsistent with affording absolute immunity for Brady violations. given the limited availability of other sanctions, such an exception would provide at the very least a meaningful remedy to individuals whose constitutional rights were violated, and who were wrongfully deprived of their liberty by a prosecutor's unlawful conduct.
